

Commentary and Debate

THE SINGLE MOTHERHOOD PENALTY AS A GENDER PENALTY: COMMENT ON BRADY, FINNIGAN, AND HÜBGEN¹

INTRODUCTION

In their important and influential article, “Rethinking the Risks of Poverty: A Framework for Analyzing Prevalences and Penalties,” Brady, Finnigan, and Hübgen (2017; hereafter BFH) analyze the extent to which poverty in rich democracies is accounted for by four risk factors: single motherhood, low education, unemployment, and young headship. They disaggregate poverty rates, and their variation across countries, into the *prevalence* of households with the risk factors and the poverty *penalty* attached to the risks. Analyzing data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS 2010), BFH conclude that “a focus on risks does not provide a convincing explanation of poverty, [and] single motherhood may be the least important of the risks” (2017, p. 740). Instead, they argue, it is the variations in the poverty penalties attached to risks that account for cross-country differences in the rate of poverty.

Central to the argument in BFH’s article and accompanying public commentary (Brady et al. 2018) is their conclusion that the connection commonly made in policy and in theory between single motherhood and poverty rests on the case of the United States, where the penalty to being a single mother is exceptional (Brady et al. 2018). In most other rich countries, they find that single motherhood comes with little or no heightened poverty risk. This contradicts earlier research that has shown single motherhood to be an important risk factor for poverty across rich countries (McLanahan and Carlson 2001; Rainwater and Smeeding 2004; Esping-Andersen 2009).

BFH use more recent data and consider poverty for all working-age households, rather than for women or children specifically. Their analysis is novel, in that it attempts to estimate poverty penalties to each of the risk factors they consider, net of the penalties of the other three risks. They argue

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that penalties for any single risk should be “conditional on other risks and a reasonable set of other potential confounders . . . to guard against conflating the penalty of one risk with another (e.g., the penalty for single motherhood should be net of unemployment, young headship, and low education)” (BHF, p. 743). While the authors are clear that it is not their intention to distinguish between causal effects and statistical associations, the major problem with their approach is that it confuses mediating and confounding variables.

Penalties should be easy to interpret, because they simply compare mean differences in poverty risks of one group with that of another. Yet, a penalty’s value depends entirely on the group it is being compared to. Both general and specialist readers might reasonably presume that a single-motherhood penalty is the poverty risk for all single mothers, relative to all couples with children. Never clearly stating their comparison, BFH do little to challenge this presumption. From close attention to their footnotes, and code provided openly online, we see that the main models on which BFH base their conclusions, because of what they control for, in fact compare the poverty risk of *employed* single mothers heading their own household to *single-earner* couples with children and employed single fathers. The resulting penalties speak to only a subset of the population of interest and are not readily interpreted as single-motherhood penalties.

Failing to distinguish confounding and mediating variables is a common error in quantitative research, with discrimination between them requiring a precise, theoretically informed model of the causal processes. In this case, the number of adults employed in a household is a major part of the causal pathway linking single motherhood to poverty.

BFH’s results indicate that if single motherhood were not associated with an increased risk of non-employment, and if couple families only had one earner in employment, single mother families’ poverty risk would not be significantly higher than other families.² This does not mean that single motherhood is an unimportant risk factor for poverty.

We show that the mechanisms BFH condition on are gendered and therefore best understood as constitutive of a penalty to single motherhood, a term that denotes a partnership and parenthood status *and a gender*. We confirm that in the vast majority of couple families with a single earner it

² We could imagine a hypothetical counterfactual where differences in nonemployment risk between single mother and other households were eliminated (e.g., through a job guarantee and public childcare) and be interested in how much this closes the gap in poverty rates between household types. However, inferring this from a model controlling for nonemployment would require a strong set of assumptions (VanderWeele and Vansteelandt 2009; Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016). A penalty under a hypothetical counterfactual where the number of earners in single-mother households was raised *up* to that observed in couple households would be undefined because of a lack of common support: single-mother households, as defined, cannot be dual-earner households.

is the father who works: BFH's comparison is effectively between families with a single female and a single male earner. We find that, even in countries with significant numbers of single fathers, single fathers do not face the same risk of nonemployment as single mothers. As a result, we argue, contrary to their aims, BFH's penalties obscure much of the institutional context for poverty: a *combined* welfare, work, and household context that remains gendered.

It is not our intention to single out BFH for criticism, but instead to use their substantively important and policy-relevant article as an example of the need for a clear, theoretically justified model even when estimating and interpreting descriptive quantities such as penalties. "Rethinking the Risks of Poverty" illustrates a frequent problem in quantitative social science that arises when the estimand is poorly defined (Lundberg, Johnson, and Stewart 2021).

We begin with a note on prevalences, showing, with the case of single motherhood measured by female-household headship, how the operational definition of a group can also obscure important aspects of institutional variation. We then revisit BFH's models for single-motherhood penalties, showing how the household employment mechanisms they condition on are gendered and drastically change their comparisons and therefore estimates of penalties. Continuing with the case of single motherhood and gender, we conclude by discussing the importance for comparative analysis of recognizing the interdependencies between welfare, work, and household institutions.

PREVALENCES: DEFINING SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSEHOLDS

BFH measure single-mother households as a proportion of all working-age (under-65) households. This departs from most analyses of poverty that weight households by individuals, or by children when the goal is to show the share of children in single-mother households. The standard approach to weighting recognizes that individuals, and children specifically, are not evenly distributed across household types. Yet even if we consider exposure to poverty at the household level, BFH's measure of the prevalence of single motherhood is limited to *female-headed* households.

Many studies, we acknowledge, use female headship to identify single-mother households; data on mothers living not with a male partner but with one or more other adults is not always available. However, feminist scholars point out that the statistical category of "head of household" reinforces gendered assumptions about families and obscures gender inequality (Gamme 1998; Brückweh 2018). Depending on the institutional context, single mothers may or may not live independently as household heads. Therefore, to consider how cross-national variations in institutions affect poverty, it would be advantageous, where possible, to understand how widening the

definition of single-mother households to include those who are co-resident in other households influences estimated prevalences and the variation of those prevalences across countries.

Studies of the United States show the co-residence of single mothers, most commonly with their parents, has seen a secular upward trend—and is typically a response to poverty (Edin and Shaefer 2015; Pilkauskas and Cross 2018). The scale of co-residence in the U.S. case is also clear in the LIS data: in 2010, one in four U.S. single mothers were not living in independent households. Including co-residing single-mother households increases the proportion of single-mother-headed households in the United States by one-third, from 8.0% to 11.0% of all households (unweighted) where the head is under 65. This degree of increase is not seen in the 15 other countries for which data on co-residence is available (fig. 1). As a result, defining single motherhood by female headship leads to a meaningful underestimate of the relative prevalence of single motherhood in the United States.

PENALTIES: COMPARING SINGLE MOTHER HOUSEHOLDS' POVERTY RISK

BFH conclude that single motherhood is, in most countries, an unimportant risk for poverty. The model on which they base this conclusion conditions on the two primary mechanisms, identified in the literature, through which




FIG. 1.—Prevalence of single-mother headed households and households containing single mothers. Data are for 2010 (LIS wave 8) with the exception of Sweden (2005), Belgium (2000), and Japan (2008).

single motherhood gives rise to poverty: (1) a reduction in the number of potential earners in the household and (2) an increased risk of nonemployment at the household level. Both mechanisms are gendered: single earners in couples are in the vast majority of cases men, and the risk of household nonemployment is connected to single motherhood specifically—we find a far lower nonemployment risk for single fathers. The degree to which these gendered mechanisms apply reflects important aspects of the institutional and policy context for poverty that BFH’s comparative analysis of penalties aims to study.

First, BFH condition on having only one earner in the household. This restricts the comparison to *single-earner couples* and working single fathers. However, households headed by a single mother almost always have just one potential earner—a female earner.³ In contrast, in all countries now, a minority of couples with children has a single earner—in most cases, a male earner. Our calculations using LIS data for 2010 shows that, on average, 24% of couples with children has a single earner. The share of single earners among couples with children, furthermore, ranges from 8% in Iceland to 40% in Italy, and is 29% in the United States. On average, in 81% of the single-earner couple households with children it was the father who was employed. The proportion ranges from 46% in Sweden to 100% in Japan and 79% in the United States (figures for all countries are provided in app. table A1).

Second, BFH condition on whether the household is “unemployed,” measured as havin no one in paid employment. This means that the estimated penalties to single motherhood are the additional poverty risk for single-mother-headed households *net of the risk of no one in the household being employed*. However, while unemployment (actively looking for work) could plausibly reflect cyclical factors independent of single motherhood, *nonemployment* includes many other groups, in particular those providing full-time unpaid care. Across rich countries, we confirm in the LIS data that the elevated risk of having no one in employment in the household is higher for mothers who do not live with a male partner. This reflects the gender, as well as the number, of the adults in the household.

With the exception of Finland, we find that the employment gap for single fathers relative to couple families is substantially lower than for single mothers (fig. 2). The nonemployment penalty for single mothers ranges from about 10% in Norway and Finland to over 30% in the United Kingdom and Australia. In the United States, the nonemployment penalty to single motherhood ranks roughly in the middle of rich countries, at 16%.

³ Nonresident fathers can and in some cases do contribute a proportion of their earnings to the household in the form of child support. One-third of single mothers in the United States report receiving contributions from fathers in LIS. Any child support income received is, however, included in LIS’s measure of income and therefore poverty.




FIG. 2.—Single parents' probability of nonemployment by gender. (1) We estimate coefficients for all households containing single mothers, controlling for whether single parents are co-resident with another head. (2) As in BFH, coefficients are from linear probability models with controls for household heads' age (< 25, 25–34, 35–54) and whether low or high educated; male or female household head without children; number of children younger than 17 and number of adults older than 65 in household. Samples are weighted using household weights. CI = 95%.

How does conditioning on these gendered employment mechanisms change the comparison being made as well as the estimates of poverty penalties? Starting with BFH's models, we reestimate the single-motherhood penalty making three adjustments in turn. In all models, we stay consistent with BFH by adjusting for education (low, middle, or high education) and age (< 25, 25–34, 35–54), and measuring poverty at below 50% of the country's median income, adjusted for household size. We use LIS wave 8 (2010) where available.⁴ Figure 3 visualizes how the single-motherhood penalties change, cumulatively, with each adjustment.

⁴ We use 2010 data for the United States, while BFH use 2013 data. We also updated their data for Austria (from 2004 to 2010) and for Hungary (from 2005 to 2009). As in BFH, data are for 2000 for Belgium, 2005 for Sweden and 2008 for Japan, as close a year as available, and 2010 for all other countries. Using the same, or nearest available, year of data meaningfully reduces the coefficient of variation in penalties across countries, from 1.51 to 1.27 (table 1). We do not include South Korea in our analysis because the data shows zero single-mother households as per BFH's definition. Although beyond the scope of this comment, a full reanalysis of BFH's question would consider the robustness of results to year (and to poverty measure) particularly because 2010 data will capture recessionary as well as structural differences between countries. In some countries, including the United Kingdom, median income fell in 2010 following the 2008–9 recession, which automatically, artificially reduced poverty measured relative to median income.




FIG. 3.—Poverty penalties to single motherhood under alternative specifications. BFH compare employed single mother household heads to single-earner couples with children and single fathers. *Adjustment 2*, minus multiple earners control, compares single mother households with all working couples with children. *Adjustment 3*, minus nonemployment controls compares all single mother households to all couples with children. Models 2 and 3 use 2010 data consistently (see n. 4), and control for having single mothers in the household, single fathers in household, and for whether single parents are household heads. Models and controls are as described in fig. 2 note (2). CI = 95%.

Adjustment 1.—First, we include a binary variable for being a single father and include in our definition of single mothers those households where single mothers co-reside with other adults. This compares all employed single mother households to *single-earner couples with children*. Poverty is measured at the household level, so we also control for co-residence, so the inclusion of co-resident single mothers will not drive any differences in penalties. This results in a mean single mother penalty of 5.8%, which is almost identical to that which we get when we replicate BFH's models using consistent years of data (see n. 4 above). This adjustment does little to change the pattern of penalties that BFH find; it shows statistically significantly higher poverty among working single-mother households in 11 out of the 28 countries, and lower poverty in 3.

Adjustment 2.—Second, we remove controls for having more than one earner in the household. This model still conditions on no one in the household being employed. The new model compares *working single mothers'* poverty risk to the risk of *all working couples with children* (regardless of the number of adults in work). This results in an average single-mother penalty of 10.3% (4.5 percentage points higher than when we replicate BFH's models). The penalty in the United States, at 17.6%, is lower than that in Japan or Luxembourg, and slightly above that in the Netherlands (16.3%), Switzerland (14.1%), or Germany (13.3%). Without controls for multiple earners, single motherhood is associated with a significantly higher risk of poverty in 19 out of the 28 countries, and a lower risk of poverty only in the United Kingdom.

Adjustment 3.—Third, we remove controls for nonemployment. This model compares all single mothers—whether in paid work or not—to all couples with children. The penalty increases to a country average of 16.3% and is positive and significant at the 5% level in 27 of the 28 countries (the exception being Slovakia). The poverty penalty for single mothers in the United States—at 25.8%—is comparatively high, but not exceptional. It is only slightly higher than countries including Canada (23.4%), Germany (21.4%), and Australia (20.6%) with 9 of the 28 countries having penalties of over 20%.

BFH conclude that variations in the penalties associated with risk factors, rather than in the prevalences of risk factors, are key to understanding cross-country differences in poverty. Single motherhood, they find, is a particularly unimportant risk factor, with variations in single-mother penalties being three times greater than variation in prevalences. Replicating their analysis (table 1), we show that BFH's conclusion only holds when we condition on household employment. When we remove controls for multiple earners, the variation in penalties halves and the average size of the penalty doubles.

Excluding controls for household nonemployment reduces the cross-country variation in penalties to a level just below that for prevalence.

TABLE 1
COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION IN PREVALENCES AND PENALTIES OF SINGLE MOTHERHOOD, UNDER ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS

	PREVALENCE OF SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSEHOLDS (households headed by a single mother vs. all households with a head less than 65 years old)		POVERTY PENALTY				
	BFH	BFH with Consistent Years	BFH	BFH with Consistent Years	Adjustment 1 (employed single-mothers vs. single-earner couples with children)	Adjustment 2 (Multiple Earner Control; employed single-earner couples with children)	Adjustment 3 (Nonemployment Control; all single mothers vs. couples with children)
							NONEMPLOYMENT PENALTY (all single mothers vs. couples with children)
Mean value . . .	.051	.049	.051	.058	.058	.103	.163
Coefficient of variation (CV)	.443	.469	1.508	1.272	1.270	.736	.476
							.172
							.439

NOTE.—The consistent year and subsequent models exclude South Korea, which when run on LIS data shows zero single mothers on BFH's definition. Excluding South Korea from BFH results, using their years of data, makes little difference, giving a mean prevalence of .051 (CV .452) and a penalty of .053 (CV 1.434).

When employment is recognized as a mediator of poverty risk, and all single mothers are compared to all couple families, variation in prevalence and penalties accounts to similar degrees for cross-country differences in poverty.⁵

POLICY: GENDERED INSTITUTIONAL REGIMES

Comparative quantitative analysis continues to be a vital method in social science, and the acclamation BFH's article has received, including the 2018 best article award from the Inequality Poverty and Mobility (IPM) Section of the American Sociological Association, testifies to this. Distinguishing penalties from prevalences, and showing their variation, can highlight the role institutional contexts play in determining the risk associated with any individual- or household-level factors. Yet, sociology's major contribution to comparative analysis of social welfare has been the concept of a *regime*, which captures how state, market, and family institutions operate as a whole system (Esping-Andersen 1990). How useful or valid specific typologies of regimes are, particularly in their capacity to account for demographic and policy change and the welfare of women and minorities, is the subject of ongoing discussion. However, one advantage of a thinking in terms of regimes is that it recognizes the interdependencies between the social organization of welfare, work, and households.

BFH contrast penalties, which they attribute to institutional causes, with prevalences, which they assume do not reflect institutional or policy differences between countries. In the case of single motherhood, as BFH suggest, marginal tax and welfare incentives have been shown to have little effect on prevalence (Ellwood and Jencks 2004; Gregg, Harkness, and Smith 2009). We also note that policies in the United States aiming to reduce single motherhood (let alone poverty) through "marriage promotion"—including reducing social protections for single mothers and their children and stigmatizing them—have been ineffective, if not counterproductive (Wood et al. 2014; Schneider 2015). We strongly sympathize with Brady et al.'s (2018) critique of this agenda. Yet, while the share of single mothers in a population may not be responsive to policy, the share of single mothers who are household heads is. In the U.S. case, single mothers' co-residence decreased as earned

⁵ Inspired by BFH's framework, Laird et al. (2018) consider the role of prevalences and penalties in cross-state variation within the United States for the same four risk factors along with race and nativity (which is consistently measured within the United States), without conditioning on the other risk factors. With the exception of unemployment, they find that prevalences account for more of the variation in poverty rates than penalties (on the absolute, supplemental poverty measure). Explicitly comparing the role of market (employment) and social income, they find that on average across U.S. states, taxes and transfers reduce single-motherhood poverty penalties by 18 percentage points—much more than they reduce penalties for other risks.

income tax credits (EITCs) increased (Pilkauskas and Micheltore 2019). In countries where social payments to single mothers are more generous and less subject to conditions, we might expect to see a greater proportion of single mothers living independently.

Undoubtedly, institutions affect the poverty penalties associated with single motherhood, or other risk factors. But they affect poverty rates in part *through* their effect on employment at the household level. The male breadwinner family is no longer the modal household in any rich country. Single-earner couple families, to which BFH compare employed single-mother families, are a small share (across our countries, on average, 11%) of all working-age households. Across rich countries, a majority (on average, over 75%) of couples with children are dual-earner households (table A2). Yet the degree to which mothers, living with a partner or not, are—or are expected to be—in paid employment varies with the welfare regime (Albelda, Himmelweit, and Humphries 2004; Gornick 2004; Pettit and Hook 2009). Labor and working-hours regulations, family leave, and childcare provisions are all associated with mothers' (relative) employment rate. The level of social welfare and tax credits, and the structure and the conditions attached to those payments, also influences maternal employment rates. With no potential male earner (or caregiver) in the same household, *single* mothers' employment is particularly contingent on such policies (Dickens and Ellwood 2003; Maldonado and Nieuwenhuis 2015). Single-earner couple families are at heightened risk of poverty—even when that earner is male (Kenworthy and Marx 2018; Filandri and Struffolino 2019). Nonemployed single mothers are at a much heightened risk of poverty—even in countries with more generous, and less conditional, welfare provision (Rainwater and Smeeding 2004; Nieuwenhuis and Maldonado 2018). A household poverty penalty conditional on households having a single earner and someone in employment therefore cannot speak to the working-age population in general or much of the institutional context that affects poverty today.

The gendered nature of this institutional context is visible if we compare single mothers' poverty penalties (relative to couples with children) with single fathers. BFH note that single-father households remain rare. In our samples they account for fewer than 2% of households in all 28 countries, and fewer than 1% in 21. BFH also state that “when estimable, single-father households are not usually significantly different from couple households for poverty” (p. 749, n. 10). We estimate penalties for single fathers for the 13 countries where the LIS data includes more than 100 households headed by single fathers (fig. 4; sample sizes are provided in app. table A2). Relative to couples with children, without conditioning on employment and single earners (as adjustment 3 above), we find that single fathers actually faced a statistically significant heightened risk of poverty in 9 of the 13 countries. However, the average single-fatherhood penalty across countries is 6%—half




FIG. 4.—Poverty penalties to single parenthood by gender. (1) Models compare all single-father (and separately, single-mother) households to couples with children for the 13 countries where the LIS data provide a sample of at least 100 single fathers. We do not control for multiple earners or household nonemployment (adjustment 3). The sample and estimation methods are as described in fig. 2 notes (1) and (2). CI = 95%.

the mean single-motherhood penalty for the same countries. In the Nordic countries, the poverty penalty to single motherhood and to single fatherhood is similarly low, at about 5%. In the United States however, the increased risk of poverty associated with single fatherhood was 5%, but it was 26% for single motherhood.

We see single motherhood as at the intersection of parenthood and partnership status *with gender*. The penalty attached to this status therefore is better thought of as encompassing gendered employment penalties. When considered in this way, the penalty remains substantial across rich countries. What stands out comparatively is less the U.S. case but rather the example of the Nordic countries with their explicitly gender egalitarian and child-centered combination of employment, welfare, and family policies. In this 2010 data, the United Kingdom also stands out for its relatively low penalties, which reflect conscious attempts by the prior Labour governments to bridge the liberal, “Anglo,” and social democratic institutional models through an expansion of work-family reconciliation policies and a combination of universal and targeted, unconditional and conditional, social allowances for children (Pearce 2005; Gregg et al. 2009; Waldfogel 2010).

These comparative patterns are important because recognition that gender still structures the risk of poverty is required to design policies that reduce poverty. Feminist scholars have long highlighted the importance of thinking about the policies that organize families and work *together* (Fraser 1994; Lewis 1997; Gornick and Meyers 2004; Orloff 2009).

The difference between our and BFH's conclusions in this case points to a general difficulty in interpreting penalties attached to any social group that control for the institutional context that penalizes, and defines, them (Kohler-Hausmann 2019). For example, taking one of the other risks BFH consider, we would expect a substantial part of the risk of poverty associated with young headship relative to other working-age households to work through young adults' increased risk of nonemployment, and the prevalence of youth headship to relate to how affordable it is for them to live independently of their parents.

By highlighting the importance of the institutional context to poverty, and the potential for policy to reduce poverty, BFH's article makes an important contribution. We hope this comment will advance this vital agenda.

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Susan Harkness

APPENDIX

TABLE A1
SAMPLE SIZES FOR HOUSEHOLD TYPES

Country	Single Mothers	Single Fathers	Total Working-Age Sample
Austria	727	61	11,598
Australia	3,761	394	34,175
Belgium	168	24	4,261
Canada	2,674	680	50,962
Switzerland	692	88	14,121
Czech Republic	898	61	16,772
Denmark	4,281	364	38,331
Germany	9,013	1,281	149,795
Estonia	990	82	11,309
Spain	957	124	28,076
Finland	609	134	20,115
France	4,467	399	35,521
Greece	228	56	11,308
Hungary	134	27	3,580
Ireland	1,114	63	9,015
Israel	888	94	18,147
Iceland	391	66	7,990
Italy	363	25	15,091
Japan	112	19	9,491
Luxembourg	854	71	13,254
Netherlands	939	291	22,058
Norway	24,504	5,643	421,031
Poland	3,985	264	93,240
Sweden	1,359	290	30,373
Slovenia	205	32	10,060

TABLE A1 (Continued)

Country	Single Mothers	Single Fathers	Total Working-Age Sample
Slovakia	314	25	13,561
United Kingdom	5,582	429	47,126
United States	21,275	3,759	182,673

TABLE A2
COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN BY EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS

COUNTRY	AS A SHARE OF WORKING-AGE HOUSEHOLDS				SHARE THAT ARE SINGLE EARNER	SHARE OF SINGLE EARNER WITH MALE EARNER
	All	Non-employed	Single Earner	Multiple Earner		
Austria	.436	.004	.082	.350	.188	.817
Australia	.460	.021	.125	.315	.272	.904
Belgium	.558	.024	.116	.418	.208	.914
Canada	.431	.008	.069	.354	.160	.768
Switzerland	.455	.008	.102	.344	.224	.931
Czech Republic	.436	.011	.141	.284	.323	.929
Denmark	.479	.010	.050	.419	.104	.540
Germany	.402	.008	.088	.303	.219	.841
Estonia	.412	.012	.114	.278	.277	.807
Spain	.455	.024	.152	.273	.334	.776
Finland	.466	.009	.063	.393	.135	.714
France	.492	.012	.105	.375	.213	.771
Greece	.470	.013	.185	.258	.394	.832
Hungary	.404	.050	.108	.246	.267	.722
Ireland	.528	.062	.193	.273	.366	.627
Israel	.638	.038	.206	.394	.323	.762
Iceland	.527	.002	.042	.480	.080	.667
Italy	.456	.014	.180	.262	.395	.928
Japan	.448	.002	.159	.287	.355	1.000
Luxembourg	.507	.006	.143	.357	.282	.860
Netherlands	.482	.006	.062	.414	.129	.806
Norway	.487	.006	.043	.438	.088	.674
Poland	.522	.036	.205	.281	.393	.873
Sweden	.459	.009	.056	.394	.122	.464
Slovenia	.438	.006	.078	.353	.178	.667
Slovakia	.377	.011	.088	.278	.233	.852
United Kingdom	.438	.028	.119	.290	.272	.849
United States	.442	.010	.129	.303	.292	.791
Mean	.468	.016	.114	.336	.244	.813

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